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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
The report presents two different models for derivation of plant specific frequency, in case of Loss of Coolant 
Accident (LOCA), using specific data from Goesgen NPP, as well as data from the OPDE-database. The first 
model is using the EPRI methodology of pipe section, and the second model is using the Markov modelling for 
piping reliability assessment. 
 
For both methods, the pipe boundaries are considered to be ASME Class 1 pipes, with diameters between 10 
and 750 mm.  
 
The information gathered provides valuable insights with respect to Goesgen pipe reliability and can be used for 
different applications, as for example the evaluation of LOCA or the frequency of internal floods. The information 
gathered also provides insights with respect to evaluation of the efficiency of the plant-specific ageing 
management program. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) studies, the failures of passive components are mainly taken into 
account in addressing initiating event frequencies. 
Even if the passive components are considered highly reliable, some unforeseen failure events are 
still possible, and this was proved by the operating experience (failures caused by thermal fatigue, 
stress corrosion cracking). Still, these are not numerous events, and the lack of failures of these 
components makes the collection of statistical data quite difficult. A piping reliability parameter data 
handbook would be very useful for risk-informed applications that involve the consideration of 
structural integrity of piping systems. 
The following methods can be used to estimate the reliability of passive components: 
- probabilistic fracture mechanics/ structural reliability models 
- statistical estimation from experience data, using large databases 
- expert judgments (decision based on e.g. deterministic structural models and operating 
experiences) 
In the last period of time, many organizations have performed some major work in order to assess 
frequencies for pipe degradations and failures. Some examples are given below. 
In the frame of OECD-NEA Piping Failure Data Exchange Project (OPDE), an international database 
on pipe degradation and failures in commercial NPP in OECD Member Countries has been 
developed. 
The database supports the following activities: 
- Trend analyses, including ageing trend analyses 
- Statistical analyses to determine pipe failure rates and rupture frequencies for use in risk-
informed activities (e.g., loss-of-coolant-accident frequency assessment, internal flooding 
initiating frequency assessment) 
- Degradation mechanism analysis in risk-informed in-service-inspections (RI-ISI) applications 
- Development of protection measures against systematic pipe failures 
ODPE data base can be used as source of data parameters (input) to probabilistic fracture mechanics 
codes, and it can provide information on degradation susceptibilities and degradation rates, 
information useful in the verification and validation of probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) codes. 
R-Book (Sweden) is a project that used the screened OPDE data and operating experience, in order 
to obtain rupture frequencies for various leakage threshold values for pipes according to initial 
defects, pipe size, type of piping components and materials. 
GRS has updated and extended the details on the estimation of leak and break frequencies in piping 
systems for the PSA. The statistical method, based on the evaluation of the German operational 
experience for piping systems with different diameters, was updated by the inclusion of structure 
reliability models based on fracture mechanics calculation procedures. 
In support of risk-informed revision of the design-basis break size requirements for NPP, US NRC had 
estimated the loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) frequency estimates using an expert elicitation 
process.  The objective was to develop separate BWR and PWR piping and non-piping passive 
system LOCA frequency estimates as a function of effective break size and operating time through 
the end of license extension. In this process, service history data and insights from probabilistic 
fracture mechanics (PFM) studies were consolidated with knowledge of plant design, operation, and 
material performance. 
NUREG 6936 provided estimates of initiating events at U.S. nuclear power plants, based on operating 
experience as well as other engineering evaluations. The objectives of the study were: 
- to provide revised frequencies for the initiating events,  
- to compare these estimates with prior estimates used in PRA  
- to review the plant trends data related to specific plant types (PWR plants versus BWR plants).  
Loss-of-coolant accidents including pipe breaks were a major consideration in the study. The study 
used as sources of data the NRC Licensee Event Reports (LER) - events of interest were limited to 
those that resulted in reactor trips, events like occurrences of small leaks and observations of material 
degradation were not taken into account.  
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The estimated frequencies for LOCA events were less than the frequencies for other important 
initiating events such as loss of offsite power and loss of feedwater flow.  
For medium and large breaks, the frequencies were based in part on the operating data for small 
breaks and in part on conservative estimates from available fracture mechanics evaluations for the 
ratios between frequencies for the different LOCA categories.  The frequency for medium pipe break 
LOCA was estimated to be 4 × 10-5 (per plant per year), and for large pipe break LOCA was 
estimated to be 5 × 10-6 (per plant per year). 
The frequency for the small pipe break LOCA was estimated to be 5 × 10-4 (per plant per year) for 
both PWR and BWR plants. For PWR plants, the estimated frequency for steam generator tube 
rupture was about a factor of 10 greater, at 7 × 10-3 (per plant per year). 
 
It was considered that aging may have the greatest effect on intermediate diameter (6 to 14-inch 
diameter) piping systems due to the large number of components within this size range and the fact 
that this piping generally receives less attention than larger diameter piping and is harder to replace 
than the more degradation-prone smaller diameter piping. [7] 
Some general conclusions could be drawn from this study: 
- the number of precursor events (cracks and leaks) is generally a good barometer of the LOCA 
susceptibility for the associated degradation mechanism 
- welds are almost universally recognized as likely failure locations due to high residual stress, 
preferential attack of many mechanisms, and the increased defect likelihood 
- the biggest frequency contributors for each LOCA size tend to be systems having the smallest 
pipes, or component, which can lead to that size LOCA  - a complete break of a smaller pipe, 
or non-piping component, is generally more likely than an equivalent size opening in a larger 
pipe, or component, because of the increased severity of fabrication or service cracking 
- the PWR LOCA frequencies are dominated by the non-piping  contributions for LOCA 
Categories 1 and 2. The major piping contributors for PWR (and BWR) Category 1 and 2 
LOCA are the instrument and drain lines. 
The steam generator tube rupture frequencies are normally separate from other passive system 
failures in probabilistic risk assessment analyses because they have occurred relatively frequently. 
The relative non-piping contributions are much higher for PWR plants because of plant design 
differences and the increased population of non-piping primary pressure boundary components.  
 
Within the framework of the participation of NPP Goesgen to Ageing PSA network a systematic 
investigation of NPP Goesgen pipe reliability has been performed, in the following steps: 
1. Collection of plant-specific information from plant-specific in-service inspections records 
(according to inspection protocols) 
2. Development of a plant-specific database containing the information from NPP Goesgen pipe 
inspections 
3. Analysis of generic information of the OPDE database with respect to characteristic pipe flaws 
and their applicability to NPP Goesgen conditions 
 
The information gathered provides valuable insights with respect to Goesgen pipe reliability and can 
be used for different applications, as for example the evaluation of LOCA or the frequency of internal 
floods. The information gathered also provides insights with respect to evaluation of the efficiency of 
the plant-specific ageing management program.  
The evaluation of LOCA-frequency for NPP Goesgen was performed using the information collected 
at Goesgen as well as data from the OPDE-database. Two different methods have been applied: 
1. The EPRI-methodology [2] 
2. A Markov model approaches [1] 
For both methods, the pipe boundaries are considered to be ASME Class 1 pipes, with diameters 
between 10 and 750 mm.  
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2 WORKING CONSIDERATIONS 
2.1 In-service inspection practice at NPP Goesgen 
According to SVTI - Festlegung NE-14 – In Service Inspection Program, rev. 6, from 1.01.2005, for 
Class 1 pipe components is required that the following tests to be performed in KKG: 
 
- for D≥ 100mm is required a 25% volumetric test (UT, X Ray) of welds; 
- for 25<D<100 mm is required to perform a 10% surface testing (MT, PT) on ferritic materials 
and 5% volumetric testing on austenitic materials;  
Obs.: Class 1 pipe materials are austenitic only in KKG, with the exception of the HKL-Reactor 
Coolant System pipes, which are ferritic with austenitic cladding materials.  
- for D≤ 25mm it is not required any ND test, although the connections between main pipes and 
these tubes (up to the first valve) are also subject to volumetric and surface testing.  
 
The time interval for performing all tests mentioned above is 10 years. The location of the welds does 
not change over one interval to another. This inspection practice is applied according to ASME Code 
XI regulations and is common to the majority of utilities, at least on PWR type.  
 
From discussion with the specialists of ISI program of KKG it was learned that during volumetric or 
surface inspections performed from one time interval to another it may happen that an originally 
welding failure (root fusion failure, pores, intrusions, lack of fusion between base and weld materials) 
to evolve into a part-crack failure. This fact is confirmed by Ref. 6, pag. 4-7, where is specified that 
particularly lack of fusion types of failures can lead to crack propagation. 
 
 
2.2 Structure of Pipe Failure Database in Goesgen NPP 
Goesgen NPP pipe failure database structure is based primarily on the structure and concept of 
OPDE database, and use a relational structure of tables, queries, reports and forms on pipe 
degradation and failure.  
To the basic table of OPDE database (3755 registrations, from 1970 to 2007) were added few more 
fields which accounts for the particularities of the data from Goesgen NPP. The data were extracted 
from the reports of Non Destructive tests performed in the plant systems over the period between 
1977 and 2008. Further refinement was done to eliminate the pipe components not in the purpose of 
the study: snubbers, hangers, holders, supports, pump casings, valve bonnets. According to KKG 
internal classification of protocol findings (Dokument-Nr. VOR-M-0212), there are five codes of 
findings:  
N – without finding,  
B – no further measures to be taken,  
R – the finding is compulsory to be registered because the limits of the ND specification were 
trespassed,   
D – the finding must be discussed and reasons for performing certain actions must be given, 
U – unacceptable finding, it is required to repair, to take compensatory actions and eventually to 
request regulatory permission to further operate. 
From these codes, into the database were imported only R, D and U codes and from these codes it 
were further detailed only the records that do not contain 0 (i.e. R0, D0, U0) – a manual screening 
process was necessary.  
The input into the Goesgen NPP Pipe failure database consists in 385 protocols, of which 163 were 
partially completed in respect to the information related to plant operating state, failure type, corrective 
action, system group, component affected, dimensions and material of pipe,  process medium, crack 
dimension and other plant specific fields.  
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3 EVALUATION OF LOCA FREQUENCY FOR NPP GOESGEN USING 
THE EPRI METHODOLOGY  
3.1 EPRI methodology 
EPRI Technical Report 1013492, “PRA Compendium of Candidate Consensus Models”, provided a 
structured methodology for estimation of the pipe failure rates to be used in LOCA frequency 
assessments, according to pipe location and size. 
This method operates with a series of concepts, some, like pipe section, being inherited from WASH–
1400 study, and some being new. The new concepts are briefly explained bellow:  
 
- Pipe section - a segment between major discontinuities like valves, pumps, tees 
(instrumentation connections are not considered as such), with length between 10 to 100 feet 
and containing 4 to 8 welds, several elbows and flanges; 
 
- Diameter size groups: i=3; 1 is the smallest; 
 
- Equivalent break area – describes the severity of failure for each of the 3 pipe size categories 
described by diameter size groups. For example, R1 is the equivalent break area of size 
diameter 1 and is assigned to a failure in all 3 diameter size categories. For size 1 diameters, 
R1 corresponds to a complete rupture. R2 is the equivalent break area of size 2 diameter and 
corresponds to a failure in pipe size diameters 2 and 3. For pipe size 2 diameters, R2 
represents a complete rupture; 
 
- Conditional probability – represents the probability that a break in size group j will have the 
equivalent break area of size group i, i≤j. 
 
The concept of pipe section is considered to be more powerful than the concept of the physical length 
of a pipe system, because it contains more than one weld, and it was demonstrated [4] that about half 
of the total number of failures in pipe components in ASME Class 1 systems are due to welds. On the 
other hand, the length by itself is a weak measure as it cannot incorporate the important pipe 
components which are more prone to failure. The section contains basically all the elements which 
are susceptible to failure: welds, elbows, straight pipe, etc. From this perspective, the pipe section can 
be treated as normalization. The last argument in favor of pipe section concept is that the counting of 
these elements from an existing isometric drawing is much easier than counting the pipe length and 
the number of each significant piping discontinuity [2].  
 
EPRI report has established a database using available pipe failure data from Licensee Event 
Reports, Nuclear Power Reliability Data System and other data sources. This database was used to 
derive the frequencies of failure per section and per hour, on each size group.  
 
In Ref. 2 is derived also a correction factor which considers the plant age. The population failure rate 
shows a decreasing trend with plant age, reflecting the corrective actions that have been implemented 
throughout the nuclear industry in overcoming the generic causes of pipe failures. 
 
Because the Ref. 2 makes the subject of a License Agreement, in the present document are not given 
details regarding the methodology or the preliminary parameters obtained by applying this method.  
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3.2 Application of EPRI methodology to NPP Goesgen 
In KKG power plant, on time window from initial criticality (01.01.1979) to September 2008, no rupture 
events were recorded on any pipe size category of ASME Class 1.  The following number of pipe 
sections, for this ASME Class were counted: 
 
Table 1 – Number of pipe sections for each diameter class 
 
 
10≤Dn<50 50≤Dn<150 Dn≥150 
No. of pipe sections 40 33 34 
No. of ruptures 0 0 0 
            
 
By applying Bayes method using as generic values the frequencies per section and hour, given in 
Ref. 2 and updating it with plant specific evidence from above, the values obtained for rupture 
frequency for ASME Class 1 systems (composed mainly by RCS) are indicated in Table 2. On the 
third row of this table are given the failure frequencies considering the age of 29 years of KKG plant. 
The error factors of these values are calculated in [2] assuming a Poisson process with upper and 
lower uncertainty bounds of the failure rate using the Chi-squared distribution at 95% and 5% and 
with 2n+2 and respectively 2n degrees of freedom. The resulted error factors are variable in the 
interval (10, 30). 
 
 
Table 2 – Rupture frequency considering no ageing and plant age by a power law 
 
Hypothesis Zs (1/y) Zm (1/y) Zl (1/y) 
Failure frequency, 
no plant age 7.89E-05 4.59E-06 4.27E-06 
Failure frequency 
with plant age 4.76e-05 2.77e-06 2.58e-06 
 
Where:  
Zs is the frequency of small breaks with equivalent diameter between 10 and 50 mm. This represents 
a complete rupture for pipes within this diameter range, or leaks for pipes with diameter larger than 
50mm, having equivalent break area between 10 and 50 mm. 
 
Zm is the frequency of breaks having equivalent diameter between 50 and 150 mm. This represents 
complete ruptures for pipes within this diameter range or leaks for pipes with diameters larger than 
150 mm, having equivalent break area between 50 and 150 mm. 
 
Zl is the frequency of complete rupture for pipes with diameter larger than 150 mm.   
 
 
 
4 EVALUATION OF LOCA FREQUENCY FOR NPP GOESGEN USING 
MARKOV MODEL 
 
4.1 Markov modelling technique 
As an effort to develop the technology for Risk Informed In Service Inspection (RI ISI) evaluations, 
this method include a Markov modelling technique for predicting the reliability of components that can 
be repaired. The method could be used for piping reliability assessment and for predicting the 
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influence of alternative inspection strategies on piping system reliability [1] The objective of this 
approach was to explicitly model the interactions between failure mechanisms that produce failures 
and the inspection, detection and repair strategies that can reduce the probability of failures 
occurrence. The cases when cracks or leaks will progress to ruptures before being detected and 
repaired were also taken into account (modelled).  
The model starts with the representation of the “piping system” as a set of discrete and mutually 
exclusive states. At any moment in time, the system is allowed to change the state in accordance with 
whatever competing processes are appropriate for the plant state. In this application of Markov model, 
the states refer to various degrees of piping system degradation, starting from flaws and progressing 
to leaks and ruptures. The change of state is given by the various failure mechanisms and by the 
inspection and repair activity performed before progression of a flaw into rupture. This method was 
found to meet the requirements of an up-to-date analysis of piping reliability. Some of these 
requirements are mentioned below:  
- account for statistical evidence and engineering insights of plant experience; 
- evaluate the impact of changes in In-service Inspection strategy, like adding or removing of the 
locations to the existing ISI program or even changing from fixed to randomly selected locations from 
one inspection interval to another; 
- address uncertainties in the reliability assessment and account for it in estimating pipe ruptures and 
in Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF). [1] 
 
In a PSA model, pipe ruptures are considered as initiating events. These initiating events are normally 
assumed to be independent of plant age (constant failure rate model). With Markov model it is not 
necessary to make this assumption as the question of whether the failure frequency is constant or not 
is evident in the solution of a particular model, this solution involving a time dependency.  
 
The set of differential equations are built based on the general Markov model. [1]  
The model involves four different states:  
- Success (S),  
- Detectable Flaw (F),  
- Detectable Leak (L)  
- Rupture (R).  
The solutions to differential equations represent the time dependant probabilities of pipe system to 
occupy each of these states and these solutions can be determined either numerically or analytically. 
Further, to determine the system failure rate or hazard rate, first it should be determined the system 
reliability function for the generic model and then it should be derived the hazard rate as a function of 
the reliability function (according to the definition of the hazard rate). 
Since we are primarily concerned about pipe ruptures and we intend to estimate pipe rupture 
frequencies, it is assumed that any state except R is a success state. Using this concept, the reliability 
function of the Markov model, r{t}, is given by: 
 
r{t} = 1-R{t} = S{t} + F{t} + L{t} 
 
The hazard rate for pipe ruptures, h{t}, is given by: 
 
h{t} = 
dt
tdR
tRdt
tdr
tr
}{
}{1
1}{
}{
1
−
=−  
 
It is demonstrated that the time dependant hazard rate starts at 0 at t=0 and gradually increases 
towards an asymptotic hazard rate, hSS, over a system time constant determined by the value of the 
transition rate parameters of the specific model. [1] 
In practice, the growth of the time dependent hazard rate is too slow to reach the asymptotic value 
within a plant lifetime. Therefore it can be said that the Markov model is showing a monotonically 
slowly increasing failure rate over the plant lifetime.  
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Comment: the model presented in [1] can be expanded in order to incorporate a more detailed 
representation of flaw detection probabilities, taking into account the different efficiency of different 
methods of detection. 
 
 
4.2 Application of the Markov model 
To apply this method, both databases were used (OPDE database and NPP Goesgen pipe failure 
database).  
The relevant information for the present study was given by failure and degradation events on ASME 
Class 1 pipe systems.  
 
 
4.2.1 Goesgen NPP specific parameters 
4.2.1.1 Classification of the events in OPDE and Goesgen NPP pipe failure database 
A thorough evaluation of types of events included in both database (records referring to welds on 
ASME Class 1 system) led to the conclusion that 4 categories of events can be considered: 
 
- Minor flaws inside the welding seam, like gas intrusions, lack of fusion, pores, weld root 
failures, found with volumetric tests (Ultrasonic and X-Ray tests), which can evolve into a more 
severe, surface degradation. These types of welding failures cannot be found in OPDE 
database. 
 
- Signs of visible deterioration (using surface tests Penetration Liquid and Magnetic Particle 
tests) like Crack-Part and Crack-Full, representing indications of degraded conditions but 
without active leaks. After checking the records regarding Reportable Events it was concluded 
that this type of events can be included also into the second category. These types of Crack-
Part, Crack-Full and Reportable Events can be found in OPDE and in KKG pipe failure 
database also.  
 
- Increasing spectrum of leaks, named P/H Leak, Small Leak, Leak, Large Leak.  
 
- Rupture and Severance events. A rupture represents a major structural failure resulting in a 
significant through-wall flow rate. A severance implies a 3600 circumferential, through-wall 
crack [5]. From OPDE database it was found that these events took place in pipe diameters < 
60mm, as a result of fabrication error, water hammer events and stress corrosion cracking.  
 
The Table 3 is summarizing in figures all the 4 categories of events in KKG pipe failure database and 
in OPDE database, for events related to welds on ASME Class 1: 
 
Table 3 – Category of events 
 
Category KKG events OPDE events 
 
2* 18 - 
3 3 46 
4 - 115 
5 - 4 
* - Category 1 is considered to be the success state 
 
As it can be observed from the table, the OPDE failure data are biased toward what could be defined 
as important failure events (Category 3, 4 and 5), with the tendency to neglect the possible 
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precursors. Therefore, in calculation of point estimate of parameters of Markov model, for Category 2 
flaws it was considered only KKG experience. 
 
 
4.2.1.2 Description of the Markov model for KKG plant 
Considering the particularities of ISI program in KKG, the Markov model from Figure 1 was proposed: 
  
 
 
 
The present model has been build under the following assumptions, based on the observed data 
(from data collection system in KKG) and on approach to Markov model [1]: 
- leak before break model which states the transition from success to break state cannot 
happen directly, at least in the inspected amount of pipe components.  
- it has to exist always a form of indication like weld root failure, weld layer stratification or wall 
thinning, part-crack, before a leakage can happen, at least in the inspected amount of pipe 
components. 
- repair actions are performed only on visible pipe component deterioration and on leak 
seepages, and the repair action is fully restoring the component to its original, success state. 
- an existing degradation within the limits of Category 2 will be detected with 0.9 probability of 
detection, given the pipe component is inspected. [1] 
- an existing degradation within the limits of Category 3 will be detected with 1 probability of 
detection. 
- the major contributors to a pipe failure were considered the weld zones, in accordance to Ref. 
4, pag. 114. This assumption was confirmed by the statistics in OPDE database for the 
relevant pipe category: From the total of 327 events in OPDE for PWR plants and for ASME 
Class 1 systems, a number of 167 events are related to welds and the rest to other pipe 
components like elbows, straight pipe elements, fittings, nozzles, etc. It results that roughly the 
proportion between weld and other pipe elements contribution to failure is equally shared.  
- the failure causes considered in this study were: stress corrosion cracking, design/ 
manufacturing/ construction errors and fatigue (caused by vibrations or temperature). These 
were the main failure causes found in OPDE database and also in KKG database, applicable 
for PWR plants, ASME Class 1 pipe systems.  
 
λT 
C5 
λR 
ρ2 
ρ3 
φ 
λ2 
λ1 
µ ω 
C1 
C2 
Pipe Element States 
 
C1 - Success, no detectable damage state 
C2 - Category 2 events, welding failures 
C3 - Category 3 events, part-cracks, full-cracks, reportable 
events 
C4 - Category 4 events, through-wall leaks 
C5 - Rupture or severance events 
 
State Transition Rates 
φ – welding failures occurrence rate 
λ1 – part-crack failure rate, given welding failures 
λ2 – leak failure rate, given part-crack failures 
λR – leak failure rate given welding failures 
λT - part-crack failure rate given success state 
ρ3 – rupture failure rate given leaks 
ρ2 – rupture failure rate given part-crack failures 
ω – repair rate of part crack failures  
µ – repair rate of leaking failures 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Markov model 
C4 
C3 
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In order to compute the time dependant probability for the pipe components in each state (C1, C2, C3, 
C4 or C5), a set of differential equations were built: 
 
µωλϕ ⋅+⋅++−= 4311 )( CCCdt
dC
T  
 
)( 1212 RCCdt
dC λλϕ +−⋅=  
 
)( 2231213 λρωλλ ++−⋅+⋅= CCCdt
dC
T  
 
)( 342324 ρµλλ +−⋅+⋅= CCCdt
dC
R  
 
34235 ρρ ⋅+⋅= CCdt
dC
 
 
Since the five states are mutually exclusive, at any given time moment t, we have  
 
154321 =++++ CCCCC  
 
 
4.2.1.3 Boundary Conditions of the Markov model 
These conditions have been established considering the KKG plant experience.  
From Komponentenprüfplan – the situation of findings on welds of system YA pipes it was found a 
number of 12 distinct indications dating from late period 1977-1987, which can be interpreted as types 
of welding failures existing already at the beginning of plant operation. 
Therefore, the hypothesis of Ref. 1 that all safety related pipes are free of detectable flaws at the 
beginning of operation cannot be sustained.  
At the moment t=0, it was considered that from the total of inspected welds, 12 welds were having 
fabrication failures. All of these 12 welds were located in pipes with diameter bigger than 100 mm. 
The success state at the moment t=0 is: 
92.0}0{
,
25.0*625
121}0{
1
1
==
−==
tC
tC
 
 
C2{t = 0}= 0.08 
 
C3{t = 0}=0 
 
C4{t = 0}=0  
 
C5{t = 0}=0 
 
Because the calculations are split according to 4 different diameter intervals, it can be assumed at the 
starting moment t=0 for the calculations on 150≤Dn<220 and t=0 for the calculations on Dn≥220, to 
have the following point values of state probability:  
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C1{t = 0}=0.92 
 
C2{t = 0}= 0.08 
 
C3{t = 0}=0 
 
C4{t = 0}=0  
 
C5{t = 0}=0 
 
For 50≤Dn<150, since half of this interval is covering the Dn > 100 condition, it was assumed as initial 
conditions:  
 
C1{t = 0}=0.96 
 
C2{t = 0}= 0.04 
 
C3{t = 0}=0 
 
C4{t = 0}=0  
 
C5{t = 0}=0 
 
For Dn<50 diameter interval, it was assumed that initial conditions are free of fabrication flaws:  
 
C1{t = 0}=1 
 
C2{t = 0}= 0 
 
C3{t = 0}=0 
 
C4{t = 0}=0  
 
C5{t = 0}=0 
 
 
4.2.1.4 Development of Markov model parameters 
The following set of tables gives the model parameters (in bold letters) and their additional values 
(indicated always before the model parameter description), their definition, source of data and formula 
used for calculation. Also, where it was considered necessary, additional explanations regarding 
parameter derivation were given. 
 
Table 4 - Derivation of occurrence rate of flaws within Category 2 (welding failures) 
 
Parameter Definition Source or method 
used for estimation  
Formula 
used 
Value 
n1s Number of occurences 
within Category 2, 
Dn<100 mm 
KKG pipe failure 
database 
 0 
N0s Number of pipe 
components (welds) that 
provided the n1s 
occurences 
Isometrics of Safety 
Class 1 systems, 
Dn<100 mm 
 484 
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fs Fraction of pipes Dn<100 
mm inspected according 
to the KKG inspection 
plan 
 
SVTI- Festlegung NE-
14 – In Service 
Inspection Program, 
rev. 6/ 01.01.2005 
Median value 
between 10% 
and 5%  
0.075 
T1 Time over which flaws of 
Category 2 were 
collected 
KKG pipe failure 
database 
 22 years 
PFD Probability that a flaw 
within Category 2, 
Dn<100 mm will be 
detected given this pipe 
component will be 
inspected 
Ref.1  0.9 
φs Category 2 events 
occurrence rate for 
Dn<100 mm 
Bayes update (0 
failures) of a non-
informative prior 
distribution 
τ⋅2
1
 
τ – number 
of weld-
years, 
ss TfN ⋅⋅⋅= 10τ
 
6.95E-04/y 
n1l Number of occurences 
within Category 2, 
Dn≥100 mm 
KKG pipe failure 
database 
 18 
N0l Number of pipe 
components (welds) that 
provided the n1l 
occurrences, Dn≥100 
mm 
Isometrics of Safety 
Class 1 systems 
 141 
fl Fraction of pipes Dn≥100 
mm inspected according 
to the KKG inspection 
plan 
 
SVTI- Festlegung NE-
14 – In Service 
Inspection Program, 
rev. 6/ 01.01.2005 
 0.25 
T1 Time over which flaws of 
Category 2 were 
collected 
KKG pipe failure 
database 
 22 years 
PFD Probability that a flaw 
within Category 2, 
Dn≥100 mm will be 
detected given this pipe 
component will be 
inspected 
Ref.1  0.9 
φl Category 2 events 
occurrence rate for 
Dn≥100 mm 
 
FDll PTfN
n
⋅⋅⋅
=
10
1ϕ
 
2.57E-02/y 
 
Comment: The φs value compared to φl is explainable if we take into consideration the type of 
failures (actually minor flaws) and the difference in amount of material to be searched for flaws. Still, 
this result is in disagreement with the generic tendency of failure rate in small pipe diameters, which 
usually is bigger than that in large pipe diameters.  
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Table 5 - Derivation of occurrence rate of Category 3 type (part-cracks, full cracks), given the total of 
inspected welds 
 
Parameter Definition Source or method 
used for estimation  
Formula 
used 
Value 
n2 Number of occurrences of 
Category 3 (part-cracks)  
KKG pipe failure 
database 
 3 
N1 Number of pipe components 
that provided the n2 
occurrences (total of surface 
and volumetric tests on 
different locations on ASME 
Class 1) 
Explanation bellow this 
table 
 250 
T2 Time over which n2 occ. 
were collected  
KKG pipe failure 
database 
 22 years 
λ1 Category 3 type crack-
parts events failure rate 
from the volumetric and 
surface inspections  
KKG pipe failure 
database 
21
2
1 TN
n
⋅
=λ
 
5.45E-04/y 
 
From “KKG Komponentenprüfplan- tabelle for Haupkülmittelleitung YA10/20/30 Z” internal document 
it was found a number of approximate 48 different weld locations included in the In Service Inspection 
Program. If account also for weld locations on pipes which connects YA system with YP, TA and TH 
(only ASME Class 1 piping), this means a total number of approximate 250 different locations inside 
boundaries of ASME 1 piping system where ND measurements are performed. This value represents 
40% of the total number of welds on ASME Class 1, and this fact could be an indication that the In 
Service Inspection program in Goesgen NPP is oversized (fact confirmed by the QM specialists) by 
an approximate factor of 3.5, in the ASME Class 1 pipe systems. This fact is observed in the pipe 
diameters larger than 100 mm of TH and YA systems. Because this is an approximation only and 
have to be sustained by further calculations, for the rest of the parameters estimation will be used the 
values specified by SVTI for percentage of inspections (paragraph 2.1). However, sensitivity check on 
the real percentage of tested welds on Goesgen NPP may reveal interesting insights related to the 
efficiency of testing activity. 
 
 
Table 6 - Derivation of repair rate of part-cracks 
 
Parameter Definition Source or method 
used for estimation  
Formula used Value 
PIs Probability that a pipe 
component flaw within 
Category 3 will be 
inspected per inspection 
interval, for Dn<100.  
SVTI- Festlegung NE-
14 – In Service 
Inspection Program, 
rev. 6/ 01.01.2005 
Median value 
between 10% 
and 5% 
0.075 
PIl Probability that a pipe 
component flaw within 
Category 3 will be 
inspected per inspection 
interval, for Dn≥100. 
SVTI- Festlegung NE-
14 – In Service 
Inspection Program, 
rev. 6/ 01.01.2005 
 0.25 
PFD Probability that a flaw 
within Category 3 will be 
detected given this pipe 
component is inspected. 
 
Estimation  0.9 
TFI Inspection interval   10 years 
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Parameter Definition Source or method 
used for estimation  
Formula used Value 
TR (includes time for 
cooldown, isolate, repair 
itself, testing and start-
up) estimated from 
discussion with KKG ISI 
engineers to be between 
4 days and 1 month, 
depending on the pipe 
diameter.  
 
This term is very small 
compared to inspection 
interval. 
 0 
ωs Repair rate for crack-
part (i.e. Cat.3 flaws), 
for Dn<100 
Ref. 1 
)( RFI
FDsI
s TT
PP
+
⋅
=ω  
6.75E-
03/y  
ωl Repair rate for crack-
part (i.e. Cat.3 flaws), 
for Dn≥100 
Ref. 1  
)( RFI
FDlI
l TT
PP
+
⋅
=ω  
2.25E-
02/y 
 
 
Table 7 - Derivation of failure rate of part-cracks given success state 
 
Parameter Definition Source or method 
used for estimation  
Formula used Value 
n2s Number of 
occurrences of 
Category 3, with 
Dn<100 
 
KKG pipe failure 
database 
 2 
n2l Number of 
occurrences of 
Category 3 from KKG 
database, with 
Dn≥100 
KKG pipe failure 
database 
 1 
NTs Number of pipe 
components that 
provided the n2 
occurrences (total 
number of welds), 
with Dn<100 
Isometrics of Safety 
Class 1 systems 
 484 
NTl Number of pipe 
components that 
provided the n2 
occurrences (total 
number of welds), 
with Dn≥100 
Isometrics of Safety 
Class 1 systems 
 141 
T2 Time over which n2 
occ. were collected  
KKG pipe failure 
database 
 22 years 
fs Fraction of pipes 
Dn<100 mm 
inspected according 
to the KKG inspection 
plan 
 
SVTI- Festlegung NE-
14 – In Service 
Inspection Program, 
rev. 6/ 01.01.2005 
 0.075 
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fl Fraction of pipes 
Dn≥100 mm 
inspected according 
to the KKG inspection 
plan 
 
SVTI- Festlegung NE-
14 – In Service 
Inspection Program, 
rev. 6/ 01.01.2005 
 0.25 
PFD probability that a flaw 
within Category 3 will 
be detected given this 
pipe component will 
be inspected 
 
Ref. 1  0.9 
λTs Point estimate of 
frequency of crack-
parts given the total 
success state, for 
Dn<100 
Ref. 1 
FDsTs
s
Ts PfTN
n
⋅⋅⋅
=
2
2λ  
2.78E-
03/y 
λTl Point estimate of 
frequency of crack-
parts given the total 
success state, for 
Dn≥100 
Ref. 1 
FDlTl
t
Tl PfTN
n
⋅⋅⋅
=
2
2λ
 
1.43E-
03/y 
 
 
Table 8 - Derivation of leak failure rate given part-crack failures 
 
Parameter Definition Source or method 
used for estimation  
Formula used Value 
nleaks Number of Category 
4 events (leaks)with 
specified failure 
causes 
OPDE database  115 
nev Total number of 
failure events for 
welds in PWR plants, 
ASME Class 1, with 
specified failure 
causes 
OPDE database  165 
%Pl,fc Percentage of leaks 
occurred due to 
specified causes, 
from the total leak 
events 
OPDE database  0.973 
%Plc,fc Percentage of cracks 
and leaks occurred 
due to specified 
causes, from the total 
events 
OPDE database  0.95 
NR Number of reactors  OPDE database  76 
reactors 
T Time window OPDE database  35 years 
λ2 Leak events failure 
rate from Category 3 
events  
Explanations bellow 
this table TNPn
Pn
Rfclcev
fclleaks
crackleak
⋅⋅⋅
⋅
=
,
,
¦ %
%λ
 
2.68E-
04/y  
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λ2Bayes Leak events failure 
rate from Category 
3 events after 
Bayes update 
Bayes update of 
generic value using 
plant specific data 
 2.29E-
04/y 
 
 
This failure rate could be precisely determined if one would know, for the specified failure causes, 
what amount of cracks has evolved into active leaks. Since this is difficult to know, a estimation was 
made, considering the number of leaks from the total number of failures and the percentage on which 
these leaks are developed due to specified causes. 
A search made on OPDE database, for PWR plants, in case of ASME Class1 systems, for pipe 
component “*weld*” and for failure type “crack*” and “leak” revealed the results indicated in Table 9. 
 
Table 9 – Contributions for each failure cause for welds 
 
Pipe Component Failure Type Apparent Failure Cause % 
Design/manufacturing/construction 
errors  
15 
Stress corrosion cracking 70 Cracks 
Fatigue (thermal, vibration) 15 
Design/manufacturing/construction 
errors  
21.7 
Stress corrosion cracking 16.5 Leaks 
Fatigue (thermal, vibration) 59.1 
Design/manufacturing/construction 
errors  
20 
Stress corrosion cracking 30 
Welds 
Cracks and Leaks 
from total events 
Fatigue (thermal, vibration) 45 
 
As it can be noticed from the above table, these three failure causes together dominates the spectrum 
of registered failure causes, for welds category in ASME Class 1, for PWR plants.  
The number of cracks is 40. The number of leaks is 115. 
The total number of failures (cracks, reportable indications, leaks, rupture, severance) is 165. 
If we consider the leaks happened during a period of 76 reactors years multiplied by the time interval 
between the first and the last observation of a leak or crack (i.e. exposure interval), we obtain λleak/crack 
due to one of these failure causes, derived from OPDE database: 
TNPn
Pn
Rfclcev
fclleaks
crackleak
⋅⋅⋅
⋅
=
,
,
¦ %
%λ  
= 115*0.973/ (165*0.95*76*35) 
 = 2.68E-04/y 
If this value is Bayes updated, using Goesgen NPP experience of zero leaks in 22 years times/ 21 
events, assuming a lognormal prior distribution with error factor 5, it will be obtained the frequency of 
a leak evolving from cracks in Goesgen plant: 2.29E-04/y. 
 
Table 10 - Derivation of leak failure rate given welding failures 
 
Parameter Definition Source or method 
used for estimation  
Formula used Value 
n3 number of 
occurrences of 
Category 4 (leaks)  
KKG PFDb  0 
  
  
___________________________________________________________________________ Page 16 
 
N1 Number of pipe 
components that 
provided the n2 
occurrences (total 
of surface and 
volumetric tests on 
different locations, 
ASME Class 1) 
KKG pipe failure 
database 
 250 
T Exposure time   22 years 
λRs Category 4 type 
leak events failure 
rate from Category 
1 events, Dn<100 
Explanations bellow 
this table 
 3.6E-05/y, 
EF=5 
λRl Category 4 type 
leak events failure 
rate from Category 
1 events, Dn>100 
Explanations bellow 
this table 
 1.07E-
05/y, 
EF=5 
λRsBayes Category 4 type 
leaks events 
failure rate after 
Bayes updating 
with specific data, 
Dn<100 
Bayes update of 
above generic failure 
rate 
 2.87E-
05/y, 
EF=4 
λRlBayes Category 4 type 
leaks events 
failure rate after 
Bayes updating 
with specific data, 
Dn>100 
Bayes update of 
above generic failure 
rate 
 9.86E-
06/y, 
EF=4.7 
 
Conditional failure rate of having a leak considering that we have a Category 2 flaw event is estimated 
considering the following: 
- In KKG plant there were no active leak events on welds, ASME Class1 systems, in 22 reactor-years 
of monitoring; 
- In KKG plant there is an approximate number of 250 welds tested on ASME Class systems; 
- In OPDE database there is a number of 115 leaks on PWR ASME Class 1, weld components in a 
number of 61 reactors multiplied by 35 years in average plant life, multiplied by the average number 
of welds inspected on PWR. Westingouse PWR units has a number of 1605 welds on ASME Class 1 
[1].  
The inspection for leaks does not rely on ND examinations, but rather on shiftly routines and 
observations on operator crews. This means that the failure that grew such that it produces a leak has 
as exposure parameter the entire population of welds at risk for failure, not only the amount of welds 
checked for ND examinations.  
However, in our model, the meaning of λR is that the existing leaks evolved directly from a previous 
flaw state (minor welding failure), which means that for our purpose is necessary to consider that an 
amount of 7.5% of them are inspected for Dn<100, respectively 25% for Dn≥100.  
Therefore we can use the assumption that only a 10% of total leaks on OPDE database in the class of 
interest are discovered during ND examinations, the rest of them being discovered by routines and 
operational checks on primary circuit systems.  
 
To resume, for OPDE database, we have a hypothetical number of 11.5 leak events from a previous 
flaw state. The exposure of these leaks is 61 reactors multiplied by 35 years times, multiplied by 1605 
welds with 0.075 inspected for pipe diameters Dn<100 and respectively 0.25 for pipe diameters 
Dn≥100. The result obtained from OPDE database is further Bayes updated using KKG plant specific 
data, given information above.  
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The results are given in Table 10. 
 
Table 11 - Determination of detection and repair of a leak state 
 
Parameter Definition Source or method 
used for estimation  
Formula used Value 
PI Probability that a leak 
within Category 4 will 
be inspected per 
inspection interval.  
Ref. 1  0.9 
PLD Probability that the 
leaks Category 4 will 
be detected per 
inspection interval.  
Inspection practice and 
KKG ND experts 
estimates 
 1 
TLI Leak detection 
interval, it ranges 
from immediate to 
frequency of routine 
inspections for leaks 
or ASME required 
leak tests. 
Assumed based on 
Ref.1 
 1 
TR Temporary repair 
time, estimated also 
to be between 4 days 
and 1 month, 
including all the 
intermediate times.  
  4.7E-02 
years 
µ Detection and 
repair of a leak 
state 
 
)( RLI
LDI
TT
PP
+
⋅
=µ  
8.6E-01/y 
 
 
Table 12 - Derivation of rupture/severance failure rate given an existing leak 
 
Parameter Definition Source or method 
used for estimation  
Formula used Value 
ρ3 Occurrence rate of 
a rupture/severance 
from a Category 4 
state 
Explanations bellow 
this table 
 1.23E-
02/y,  
EF=4 
 
The rupture failure rate given a leak, ρ3, is estimated as follows: Once a leak exists, the probability of 
a rupture is theoretically quite large, given the existence of failure mechanisms which can propagate 
the leak into a rupture, such as water hammer. In reality, both the probability of inspection and 
detection leaks are closed to 1, considering the ASME Class 1 systems, due to the fact that we have 
an immediate annunciation in control room. 
Therefore, the rupture failure rate given a leak has to consider: 
- the leak failure rate,  
- the probability that the leak is not inspected, detected and repaired into a given time interval 
and  
- the probability that in the given time interval exist a failure mechanism which propagate the 
leak into a rupture.  
All these factors are already included in the set of differential equation written based on the Markov 
model above. 
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If a leak already exists, it is considered that a rupture event can happen only follow a water hammer 
event, whose frequency was found to be in the area of 1.97E-02/y. [1] 
This result is in accordance with the findings on ASME Class 1 piping of KKG, where no events of 
water hammer happened in 29 years of operation. A Bayesian updating of the generic data found, 
considering an error factor of 5 and a prior lognormal distribution leads to an updated frequency of 
water hammer events in KKG of 1.23E-02/y, with error factor 4. 
 
Table 13 - Derivation of rupture/severance rate given an existing part-crack state 
 
Parameter Definition Source or method 
used for estimation  
Formula used Value 
Pr¦crack, <50 Conditional 
probability of rupture 
given a crack event, 
for small pipes 
(Dn<50mm) 
OPDE database  0.1 
Pr¦crack, 50-150 Conditional 
probability of rupture 
given a crack event, 
for medium pipes 
(50≤Dn<150) 
Ref.3 
n
crackr D
P 5.2¦ =  
2.5E-02 
Pr¦crack, 150-220 Conditional 
probability of rupture 
given a crack event, 
for medium pipes 
(150≤Dn<220) 
Ref.3 
n
crackr D
P 5.2¦ =  
1.35E-02 
Pr¦crack, 
>220  
Conditional 
probability of rupture 
given a crack event, 
for large pipes 
(Dn≥220mm) 
Ref.3  1E-02  
N Number of plants 
with failures in 
corresponding pipe 
diameter class 
OPDE database  76 
T Time window of 
plants having failures 
in corresponding pipe 
diameter class 
OPDE database  35 years 
ρ2,<50 Occurrence rate of 
a rupture/severance 
from a Category 3 
state (crack), Dn≤50 
Explanations bellow 
this table TN
P crackr
⋅
=
¦
2ρ  
3.75E-
05/y 
ρ2,50-150 Occurrence rate of 
a rupture/severance 
from a Category 3 
state (crack), 
50<Dn≤150 
Explanations bellow 
this table TN
P crackr
⋅
=
¦
2ρ  
9.39E-
06/y 
ρ2,150-220 Occurrence rate of 
a rupture/severance 
from a Category 3 
state (crack), 
150<Dn≤220 
Explanations bellow 
this table TN
P crackr
⋅
=
¦
2ρ  
5.07E-
06/y 
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ρ2,>220 Occurrence rate of 
a rupture/severance 
from a Category 3 
state (crack), 
Dn>220mm 
Explanations bellow 
this table TN
P crackr
⋅
=
¦
2ρ  
3.75E-
06/y 
 
The conditional probability of a rupture or severance given a through wall crack was calculated, for 
pipe diameters Dn<50mm, from a direct estimate from OPDE database, as there is a number of 4 
ruptures and severances on welds from ASME Class 1 systems, PWR plants, considering as failure 
causes: fatigue, stress cracking corrosion and manufacturing/ design/ installation errors, on 
corresponding class diameters. The total number of cracks in OPDE, considering the same boundary 
conditions is 40. This result in Pr¦crack,<50  - from Table 13. 
 
For pipe diameters 50<Dn≤250, the estimation of Beliczey and Schultz (1990) mentioned in [3] was 
used, with 2 intermediate pipe diameters dictated by the KKG plant model on previous LOCA Initiating 
Event frequency calculation. This was performed in terms of equivalent area, which results into the 
following diameter ranges: 
SLOCA with Dn<50 mm 
SMLOCA with 50≤Dn<150 mm 
LMLOCA with 150≤Dn<220 mm 
LLOCA with 220≤Dn≤750 mm 
Therefore in estimation of crack frequencies are considered these diameter classes.  
 
Table 14 – Summary table with values of transition failure rates 
 
Name Value(1/y) Description 
φs 6.95E-04 Rate of occurrence of welding failures for Dn<100 mm 
 
φl 2.57E-02 Rate of occurrence of welding failures for Dn≥100 mm 
 
λ1 5.45E-04 Crack failure rate from the total of inspected welds 
 
ωs 6.75E-03 Repair rate for part-cracks, for Dn<100 
 
ωl 2.25E-02 Repair rate for part-cracks, for Dn≥100 
 
λTs 2.78E-03 Part-cracks, full-cracks failure rate given success state, for Dn<100 
 
λTl 1.43E-03 Part-cracks, full-cracks failure rate given success state, for Dn≥100 
 
λ2 2.29E-04 Leak failure rate from part-crack, full-crack events 
 
λRs 2.87E-05 Leaks failure rate from welding failures, for Dn<100 
 
λRl 9.86E-06 Leaks failure rate from welding failures, for Dn≥100 
 
µ 8.6E-01 Detection and repair of a leak state 
 
ρ3 1.23E-02 Rupture/severance failure rate from leaks 
 
ρ2,<50 3.75E-05 Rupture/severance failure rate from crack, Dn<50 
 
ρ2,50-150 9.39E-06 Rupture/severance failure rate from crack, 50≤Dn<150 
 
ρ2,150-220 5.07E-06 Rupture/severance failure rate from crack, 150≤Dn<220 
  
  
___________________________________________________________________________ Page 20 
 
 
ρ2,>220 3.75E-06 Rupture/severance failure rate from crack, Dn≥220mm 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Results of the analysis 
The results are calculated using Matlab 7.3.0 program, with the solver as ode45 function, with the 
initial conditions specified in paragraph 4.2.1.3 and having the constant parameters given in Table 14. 
The results represent the time dependent failure probabilities of C1(success), C2(minor flaws), 
C3(cracks), C4(leaks) or C5(rupture), for the 4 pipe diameter categories mentioned above. 
The graphical form of the C4(leaks) and C5(rupture) failure probability variation with time for each 
class of diameters are given below: 
 
Figure 2 – Time dependence of failure probability C5(rupture) for Dn<50 
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Figure 3 – Time dependence of failure probability C4(leaks) for Dn<50 
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Figure 4 – Time dependence of failure probability C5(rupture) for 50≤Dn<150 
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Figure 5 – Time dependence of failure probability C4(leaks) for 50≤Dn<150 
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Figure 6 – Time dependence of failure probability C5(rupture) for 150≤Dn<220 
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Figure 7 – Time dependence of failure probability C4(leaks) for 150≤Dn<220 
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Figure 8 – Time dependence of failure probability C5(rupture) for Dn≥220 
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Figure 9 – Time dependence of failure probability C4(leaks) for Dn≥220 
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Table 15 - point estimate of rupture failure rates, expressed in events per year, at different time 
moment of Goesgen NPP plant: 
 
Age 
(Years) 
Rupture rate 
Dn<50 
Rupture rate 
50≤Dn<150 
Rupture rate 
150≤Dn<220 
Rupture rate 
Dn≥220 
1 8.50E-08 
 
3.54E-08 
 
1.43E-08 1.27E-08 
29 2.78E-06 
 
8.53E-07 2.73E-07 2.4E-07 
40 3.67E-06 
 
1.11E-06 3.02E-07 2.68E-07 
60 5.00E-06 
 
1.53E-06 3.42E-07 3.03E-07 
 
A sensitivity check on the real percentage of tested welds on Goesgen NPP, based on the finding that 
the percentage of the inspected welds is larger than the basic percentage indicated by ASME Code XI 
(paragraph 2.1) revealed the following values of the rupture failure rates, expressed in events per 
year, at different moment of time. 
 
Table 16 –Rupture failure rates at different age 
 
Age 
(Years) 
Rupture rate 
Dn<50 
Rupture rate 
50≤Dn<150 
Rupture rate 
150≤Dn<220 
Rupture rate 
Dn≥220 
1 2.00E-08 
 
1.30E-08 8.27E-09 7.65E-09 
29 4.65E-07 
 
1.70E-07 1.24E-07 1.10E-07 
40 5.56E-07 
 
2.29E-07 1.31E-07 1.15E-07 
60 6.63E-07 
 
2.78E-07 1.50E-07 1.31E-07 
 
The comparison graphs are shown below: 
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Figure 10 – Sensitivity results for rupture failure rate, for Dn<50 
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Figure 11 – Sensitivity results on rupture failure rate, for 50<Dn<150 
 
Senzitivity check on rupture failure rate, 50<Dn<150 mm
0.00E+00
5.00E-07
1.00E-06
1.50E-06
2.00E-06
2.50E-06
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Time (year)
Ru
pt
u
re
 
ra
te
 
(1/
ye
ar
)
Goesgen NPP Inspection Program ASME Code XI basic program
 
 
  
  
___________________________________________________________________________ Page 26 
 
 
Figure 12 – Sensitivity results on rupture failure rate, for 150<Dn<220 
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Figure 13 – Sensitivity results on rupture failure rate, for 220<Dn 
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The result of sensitivity analysis shows an approximate 5.5 times larger value at age of 29 years 
between the rupture rates corresponding to small pipe diameters (Dn<150 mm) and an approximate 2 
times larger value at the same age, between rupture rates corresponding to large pipe diameters. 
This difference in findings between pipe diameters is realistic since the smaller pipes have a larger 
bias from the basic value than larger pipes, in terms of percentage of pipe inspected. The difference is 
significant and indicates the effect of over-testing on the piping reliability, however, the economical 
plant effort of this bias is not considered.  
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5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The approaches used in the study are very different under aspect of methodology and results: 
The EPRI method is using direct statistical estimates of pipe failures from U.S. plants service 
experience to develop a model which accounts for conditional probabilities of leaks and ruptures in 
different pipe diameters given the equivalent size breaks in the respective pipes. The method is easy 
to apply once all the generic values of conditional probabilities and failure rate per section and hour 
are available in the referenced documentation. The number of pipe section then is relatively easy to 
estimate given good isometric drawings available for a specific plant. Different degradation 
mechanisms are account for in a statistical manner, deriving several coefficients which factors out the 
influence of a specific degradation mechanism when it is known form experience that the mechanism 
is unlikely to occur in a specific plant.  
Ageing influence is studied from the statistical point of view using available data, building the plot of 
failure rate and deriving the corresponding law by which the failure rate is varying with time.  
This plot indicates a decreasing trend of rupture failure rate with age, suggesting a learning process 
undergone over the whole interval considered (approximately 30 years). This fact is in accordance 
with expected tendency of pipe failure rate, considering the new technologies used for early detection 
of pipe flaws, as well as the increasing maintenance crew capability to repair the pipe components 
damaged by known failure mechanisms.  
 
The Markov method models the piping system as a set of discrete and mutually exclusive states, with 
the change of state according to occurrence of a failure or a repair instance. The different states are 
represented by different degree of pipe degradation, under a known set of failure mechanisms. The 
method is used in several U.S. plants to study the impact of alternative strategies for ISI and leak 
detection.  
The application presented considers the transition rates as point estimates and uses them as 
constant values into the set of differential equations built. Therefore, the uncertainty in the parameter 
estimates and its propagation through the model to the final hazard rate distribution remains to be 
evaluated. In the present model, failure mechanism of interest are those which affect mainly the 
Reactor Coolant System pipes, i.e. stress corrosion cracking, design/ manufacturing/ construction 
errors and fatigue caused by vibrations or temperature. These were the main failure causes found in 
OPDE database and also in KKG database, applicable for PWR plants, ASME Class 1 pipe systems.  
 
The comparison between the values of rupture frequencies and the failure rates obtained using EPRI 
methodology can be made only on the pipe diameters bigger than 150mm, on both methods, by 
summing the results obtained for rupture frequencies with Markov on intervals 150<Dn<220 and 
220<Dn, as the significance of rupture frequency in Markov model is different from that of EPRI 
methodology. This comparison reveals differences of about one order of magnitude between the 
results of the two methods, in the specified interval.  
 
To conclude, some failure mechanisms are more likely to be present early in plant life, like design, 
manufacture and installation errors, while others will manifest themselves through in-service life, such 
as cyclic fatigue or erosion/ corrosion, and therefore they can only cause an increase in the failure 
rate with plant age. According to EPRI pipe section method, this increase seems to be compensated 
over the plant lifetime by other factors, while according to Markov model, over the plant lifetime the 
failure mechanisms will lead to a slow and monotonically increase of failure rate during time.  
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Abstract 
The report presents two different models for derivation of plant specific frequency, in case of Loss of Coolant 
Accident (LOCA), using specific data from Goesgen NPP, as well as data from the OPDE-database. The first 
model is using the EPRI methodology of pipe section, and the second model is using the Markov modelling for 
piping reliability assessment. 
For both methods, the pipe boundaries are considered to be ASME Class 1 pipes, with diameters between 10 
and 750 mm.  
The information gathered provides valuable insights with respect to Goesgen pipe reliability and can be used for 
different applications, as for example the evaluation of LOCA or the frequency of internal floods. The information 
gathered also provides insights with respect to evaluation of the efficiency of the plant-specific ageing 
management program.  
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